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FLYING TIGER LINE, INC. tJ. COUNTY OF L.

A.

[51

C.2d

[L. A. No. 24532. In Bank. Dec. 16, 1958.]

THE FLYING TIGER LINE, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, v. THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Appellants.
[1] Commerce-Taxation.-A county does not have power to assess

[2]

[8]

[4]

[6]

[6]

an ad valorem property tax on the full value of aircraft that
are regularly flown in interstate and foreign commerce and
physically present in the county only during part of the
period for which the tax is collected.
Id.-Taxation.-The rule permitting taxation of aircraft by
two or more states on an apportioned basis precludes taxation
on all the property by the state of domicile.
Id.-Taxation.-A taxpayer resisting an ad valorem tax on
personal property based on an unapportioned assessment does
not have the burden of showing that other states have actually
imposed a tax on such property; he is entitled to an assessment on an apportionment basis if the record shows that he
was, during a tax year, receiving substantial benefits and
protection in more than one state.
Taxation-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Conclusiveness.-When relief from an improper assessment is
sought from the board of supervisors sitting as a board of
equalization and is denied in the belief that the only issue is
one of law for the eourts, the applicant is not bound by this
decision on an appeal to the superior court.
Id.-Equalization-Powers of Local Boards.-The value of
property for assessment purposes is to be determined by the
county board of equalization on such basis as is used in regard
to other property so as to make all assessments as equal and
fair as is practicable.
Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Conclusiveness.-A county board of equalization's decision as to the value
of property and faimess of assessment so far as amount is
concemed constitutes an independent and conclusive judgment of the tribunal created by law for the determination of
that question, and cannot be avoided unless the board has

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Commerce, § 13 et seq.; Am.Jur., Taxation, I
§ 202 et seq.
I
[4] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 228; Am..Tur., Taxation, § 770. '
Melt. Dig. References: [1-3] CODlmerce, § 8; [4,6,10] Taxation, '
§ 205; [5] Taxation, § 194(1); [7] Taxation, § 203; [8] Taxation, !
§ 195; [9] Taxation, § 200; [11,12] Taxation, § 208.
I
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proceeded IIrbilrarily and in willful disrf'gllJ'd of the law
intended for itl; guidallce lind control, with the evident purpose of imposing unequal burdens on certain t.axpayers, or
unless there be something equivalent to fraud.
[7] ld.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Decision.The constitutional right to an equalization hearing by a county
board of equnlization on an application for reduction of
valuation for an ad valorem tax includes a decision, in the
light of the evidence there introduced, before any determination becomes final as to the taxpayers.
[8] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Nature of
Proceedings.-The equalization stage of a tax proceeding is
no exception to the rule that a tax proceeding is 'n inmtum
in nature and that each step must be taken in compliance
with law or the proceeding is void.
[9] ld.-Equaliza.tion-Proceedings of Local Boards-Rearing.Compliance with the constitutional requirement for an equalization hearing is not met unless the substance as well as the
form of the hearing is granted the complaining taxpayer.
[10] ld.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Conclusiveness.-A county board of equalization is the fact-finding body
designated by law to remedy excess assessments, and when that
tribunal, after due hearing and within the limits of reasonable
discretion, makes its findings on the facts, such decision is
final and conclusive.
[11] ld. - Equalization - Proceedings of Local Boards-Judicial
Review.-When a board of equalization purports to decide
a question of law or refuses to hear a case on the ground that
it involves only a question of law to be decided by the courts,
a taxpayer has the right to resort to the courts for determination of such question.
[12] ld.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-J'udicial
Review.-Where plaintiff sought relief before a county board
of equalization, on petition for redetermination of an assessment on aircraft flown in interstate and foreign commerce,
but this relief was denjed solely because the board, on the
advice of counsel, applied an improper principle of constitutional law (refused to hear the case on the ground that it
involved only a question of law to be decided by the courts),
plaintiff properly applied to the superior court for relief.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to rt'cover taxes paid under protest. Judgment for
plaintiff affirmed.

)
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Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Gordon Boller, Assist- •
ant County Counsel, and Alfred Charles DeFlon, Deputy
County Counsel, for Appellants.
Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Carl A. Stutsman, Jr., and Leon S.
Angvire for Respondent.
McCOMB, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment in favor
of plaintiff in an action to recover 1953 taxes paid under protest to the Tax Collector of Los Angeles County upon the
assessment of five airplanes.
Facts: Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation, with its principal
place of business in the county of Los Angeles. It is engaged
in business as a common carrier of freight by air, operating
in interstate and foreign commerce under a certificate issued
hy the Civil Aeronautics Board.
On the assessment date in 1953, the first Monday in March,
plaintiff owned and operated 37 aircraft of two different
types. It had 27 C-46 planes, which were used only in its
domestic commercial service. These planes did not have a
sufficient range for overseas flying. They were assessed at
a portion of their book value determined by computing the :
percentage of the total time, during a test period selected by
the county assessor, that the planes were physically present
in the county of Los Angeles. The tax on these planes is not
disputed.
Plaintiff also operated 10 DC-4 planes in flying the Pacific
airlift under control of the military authorities and in support
of the war in Korea. The route of this lift was from the
United States to Tokyo, Japan. Five of these planes were
leased by plaintiff and five were owned by it. Plaintiff's
interest in the leased planes was assessed on the same formula
applied to the C-46 planes. This tax is undisputed.
The other five DC-4 planes that were operated on the Pacific
airlift were removed from the remainder of plaintiff's fleet
of 37 planes by the county assessor and were assessed at 100 .
per cent of their value without regard to the time they were
physically present in the county. The difference between the
amount of the tax paid on the full assessment of these five I
planes and the amount which would have been taxed if the
assessor had assessed them on the same basis as all the other
planes is the amount sought to be recovered.
Plaintiff filed a petition for redetermination of the assessment before the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors,

Dee. 1958]
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sitting as a board of equalization, for the year 1953-1954. After
two hearings before the board, the application for relief was
denied. The tax was subsequently paid under protest. Thereafter plaintiff filed this suit for recovery against the county
of Los Angeles and the city of Burbank. The city was
made a defendant as required by section 5138 of the Revenue
and Taxaiion Code.·
Questions: [1] First. Does defendant county have the
power to assess an ad valorem property tax upon the full value .
of aircraft which are regularly flown in interstate and foreign
cotlunerce and physically present in the county only a part of
the time during the period for which the tax is collected'
No. The five planes involved were used chiefly in the perfOl'mance of the Pacific airlift instituted in 1950 as a result of
the Korean war, and operations during the period in question
were scheduled by the military authorities and not by the
Civil Aeronautics Board.
A proper decision of this case rests upon the application of
four United States Supreme Court decisions. In 1944 the
Supreme Court of the United States decided, in Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 [64 S.Ct. 950, 88
L.Ed. 1283, 153 A.L.R. 245], that Minnesota, the home port
state of the airline, could levY a property tax on the entire
value of a fleet of planes in spite of the fact that the same
planes were admittedly taxed on a portion of their value by
six of the seven other states through which they operated.
In 1949 the Supreme Court, in Ott v. Mississippi Valley
Barge Line, 336 U.S. 169 [69 S.Ct. 432, 93 L.Ed. 585], modified the rule previously laid down in Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v_ Minnesota, supra. The Ott case involved barges and tugs
operated up and down the Mississippi River and owned by a
corporation domiciled in Ohio. These tugs and barges were
taxed on an apportioned basis by the State of Louisiana, where
·Section 5138 of the Revenue and Taxation Code reads: "Within aix
months after the payment, an ~tion may be brought against a county
or a city in the Buperior court to recover the taxes paid under protest.
"If all or any portion of the taxes paid under protest and Bought to
be recovered were collected by officers of the county for a city, an action
must be brought against the city for the recovery of such taxes and
judgment must be Bought against the city. Where actions are brought
a.gainst both a county and a city lIuch actions may be joined in one
('omplaillt.
"Any city for which county officers collect taxes may provide for the
defense by counsel for the county of actions brought against the city
under this article, in which event it shall be the duty of Buch counsel
to defend such actions, or the city may provide that lIuch actions shan
be defended by its own counsel."
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they made certain irregular stops. The court held that
Louisiana could tax the vessels on a portion of their value.
With reference to the question of the due process aspect of a
tax of this type, the court stated at page 174: "So far as due
process is concerned the only question is whether the tax in
practical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits, or
protection conferred or afforded by the taxing State. (Citation.) Those requirements are satisfied if the tax is fairly apportioned to the commerce carried on within the State."
In 1952 the Supreme Court, in Standard Oil Co. v. Peck,
342 U.s. 382 [72 S.Ct. 309, 96 L.Ed. 427, 26 A.L.R.2d 1371],
involving vessels travelling on the Mississippi River, adopted
the rule that a domiciliary state could not tax the full value
of property located only part of the time within a state
without constituting an unreasonable burden upon interstate
commerce and thus violating the due process clause of the
United States Constitution. The court said at page 384: "No
one vessel may have been continuously in another state during
the taxable year. But we do know that most, if not all, of them
were operating in other waters and therefore under Ott v.
Mississ-ippi Barge Line Co., supra, could be taxed by the
several states on an apportionment basis. The rule which
permits taxation by two or more states on an apportionment
basis precludes taxation of all of the property by the state
of the domicile. (Citation.) Otherwise there would be mUltiple
taxation of interstate operations and the tax would have no
relation to the opportunities, benefits, or protection which the
taxing state gives those operations. "
In 1954 the Supreme Court, in Braniff .Airways, Inc. v.
Nebraska State Board of Eq. & .A., 847 U.S. 590 [74 S.Ct. 757,
98 L.Ed. 967], applied the rule previously laid down in
Standard 0,,7, ca. v. Peck, supra, to aircraft llying in interstate
commerce. This case involved a lleet of planes which had its
home port in the State of Minnesota, but which was used in
and out of the taxing state, Nebraska. Nebraska imposed
an apportioned ad valorem tax on the equipment, based upon
the percentage of time in and out of the state. The court said
at page 600: "We perceive no logical basis for distinguishing
the constitutional power to impose a tax on such aircraft from
the power to impose taxes on river boats."
[2] It thus appears that the United States Supreme Court
has now held that the rule which permits taxation by two or
more states on an apportioned basis precludes taxation on
all the property by the state of domicile.

I

..

Dec. 1958]

FLYING TIGER LINE, INC. 1.'. COUNTY OF

L. A. 819

151 C.2d 314; 3."43 P.2d 32.'1

In Sta,llna,rd Oil (fo. v. rrrk, .~lIpra, lit, page 384, the court
said: "Those casc.-;, though cxceptional on their facts, illustrate
the reaeh of the taxing power of thc statc of the domicile as
contrasted to that of the other states. But they have no
application here since most, if not all, of the barges and
boats which Ohio has taxed were almost continuously outside
Ohio during the taxable year. . . . The rule which permits
taxation by two or more states on an apportionment basis
precludes taxation of all of the property by the state of the
domicile. (Citation.) Otherwise there would be multiple taxation of interstate operations and the tax would have no
relation to the opportunities, benefits, or protection which the
taxing state gives those operations."
[3] A taxpayer resisting an ad valorem tax on personal
property based on an unapportioned assessment does not have
the burden of showing that other states have actually imposed
a tax on such property. He is entitled to an assessment on
an apportionment basis if the record shows that he was, during
a tax year, receiving substantial benefits and protection in
more than one state.
In the present case, there was no apportionment with respect
to the assessment of the five planes. Therefore, as a matter
of law, the tax was not levied upon a proper basis.
The holding in Slick Airways, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles,
140 Cal.App.2d 311 [295 P.2d 46], is in accord with the foregoing views. In that case, a fairly apportioned assessment
on planes of this type was determined by the Los Angeles
County Assessor. The company had its principal place of
business in California in 1952 and 1953. The court, at page
312, had this to say with reference to the normal assessment
procedure in Los Angeles County: "Plaintiff is engaged in
flying a fleet of airplanes in interstate and foreign commerce.
Such airplanes, under the practice of the county assessor of
Los Angeles County, are assessed on the basis of a fair allocation of time, to wit, the ratio of the time spent in Los Angeles
County as compared to total time."
Thereafter, the court properly recognized that under the
circumstances present, which were similar to those in the
instant case, the county of Los Angeles had authority to tax
only a portion of the value of the planes. In referring to
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Eq. «; A., supra, the
court, at page 314, said: "The Supreme Court, in upholding
the validity of the tax, said, at page 600: 'The limitation im·
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posrd hy thp Due Pro('es8 Clause upon state power to impose .
taxf'S upon Imch instrnmentalities was succinctly stated in the
Ott Case: "So far as due process is concerned the only question is whether the tax in practical operation has relation to
opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded ,
by the taxing State." , "
[4] Second. When relief ft'om an improper assessment i.~
sought from the board of supervisol's sitting as a board of
equfllization, and denied in the belief that the only issue is
one of law for the courts, is the applicant bound by this decision on an appeal to the superior court 1
No. Defendants argue that plaintiff is entitled to a trial "of
factual matter which should have been but was not presented
to said Board for determination." This question is not presented to this court, because the trial court rendered its decision without consideration of any evidence offered before the
trial court, basing it upon a question of law.
Security-First National Bank v. County of Los Angeles,
35 Ca1.2d 319 [217 P.2d 946], relied on by defendants, is Dot
applicable to the facts of the present case, for in that case no
application for relief was filed with the board of supervisors.
The duties of a board of supervisors sitting as a board of
tax equalization are prescribed in article XIII, section 9, of
the California Constitution, which reads, in part: "The boards
of supervisors of the several counties of the State shall constitute boards of equalization for their respective counties, whose
duty it shall be to equalize the valuation of the taxable
property in the county for the purpose of taxation. . . ."
[5, 6] The duties of the board are fully set forth by this
. court in -Universal Consolidated Oil Co. v. Byram, 25 Ca1.2d
. 353, 356-357 [153 P.2d 746] : "It must be conceded, of course,
that it is well settled in this state that to the authorized county
board of equalization has been confided the duty of determining 'the value of the property under consideration for assessment purposes upon such basis as is used in regard to other
property, so as to make all the assessments as equal and fair
as is practicable'; that in discharging this duty, 'the board is
exercising judicial functions, and its decision as to the value of
the property and the fairness of the assessment so far as
amount is concerned constitutes an independent and CODclusive judgment of the tribunal created by law for the determination of that question,' adjudicating necessarily that 'the
property is assessed at the same value proportionately as all
the other property in the county'; that such adjttdicat·ion

I!

I
II
~
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.' ~.omu)t be afJflided 11111.rRR fir r. hna.rn "(J.~ prorr.cded arbitrarily
tJ.nd in willful di.~,.rganl of tll(. lou' t11ic1Idrd Inr flleir gvidance

and control, u~th the evident purpose of imposing tmequal
burdens upon ce,.tain of the taxpayers . .. or unless there be
something equh-alent to fraud in the action of the board';
and that 'Mere errors in honest judgment as to the value of
the property will not obviate the binding effect of the conclusion of the board.' (Citations.) Wlu1e not classifiable with
I any aspect of fraud or bad faith, the lack of due process distinguishing the procedural phase of these Bqualization matters
as submitted to tke board furllishes aft eqtUllly appropriate
·basis for the co-urf's intervention in pt'otection of the pl.ain:fifls' constitutional rights." (Emphasis added.)
! [7] The court said, at page 360 [3] et seq.: "The fundamental premise of the plaintiffs recourse to the court for relief
rests upon the proposition that, as with any ad valorem tax,
their constitutional right to an equalization hearing ~mpre
bends a decision in tIle light of the evidence fhere introduced
before any determination becomes final as to them. (Citations.)
[8] As any tax proceeding is in invitum in nature, each
step must be taken in compliance with law or the proceeding
is void. The equalization stage is no exceptiou to this rule.
[9] Compliance with the constitutional requirement for an
equalization bearing is not met unless the substance as well as
tbe form of the bearing is granted to the complaining taxpayer. (Citation.) Typical illustrations of the denial of procedural due process which bave been beld to invalidate purported equalization determinations are: One man hearings
(citation) ; the taking of evidence without the presence of the
taxpayer or his representative (citations) ; the refusal to allow
reasonable opportunity for· cross-examination (citation); the
refusal to permit reasonable argument (citation); reliance in
the concluding steps upon the advice of the assessor or the
assessor's attorney, particularly if doue secretly (citation);
and the attempted det{'rmination of a case by members of tbe
board who did not hear the evidence, if tbeir vote be necessary
to the determination (citation).
"In line with these instances of the denial of procedural due
process are the present cases. The concluding steps of the
equalization proceeding are many times the most essential to
the preservation of the taxpayer's rights. "
[10] Again the court said, at page 362 [6]: "As appears
from the numerous authorities cited in tbe forepart of this
opinion, the respective county hoard of equalization is the fact11 C.24-11
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finn jn~ hody dp.signa.ted by law to remedy excessive assessmf'nl~ (Cal. Con~t., art. XIlJ, § 9), and when that tribunal,

after duC' 1H'aring and within thc limits of reasonable discretion, makes its findings on the faeis, such decision is final all.l
conclusive. "
[11] It is evident from the foregoing authority that when
a board of equalization purports to decide a (llH'stion of law.
or refuses to hear a case on the ground that it involves only
a question of law to be decided by the courts, a taxpayer has
the right to resort to the courts for determination of such
question.
In the present case, there was no dispute as to the facts,
a question of law alone being presented to the board of equalization, as appears from the following excerpt from the transcript:
"Mr. Jessup [Member of the Board] : Mr. West, there is
no chance of you and this gentleman sitting down and working
this thing out f
"Mr. Anson [Deputy County Counsel]: There is a very
definite legal issue other than the facts; I don't think there is
too much of a quarrel as regards the facts.
"Mr. Hahn [Member of the Board]: There's no quarrel
with the facts, but a legal question'
"Mr. Anson: Primarily a legal question; that is, as far as
the five aircraft covered under this second item are concerned."
(See also Mahoney v. City of San Diego, 198 Cal. 388,403
[9] 1245 P. 189], where an arbitrary method of property
valuation adopted by the assessor and approved by the board
of supervisors was held a proper subject for court review.)
[12] Applying the foregoing rule to the present case, it
appears that plaintiff sought relief before the board of equalization. This relief was denied solely because the board, on the
advice of its counsel, applied an improper principle of constitutional law. Therefore, plaintiff properly applied to the
superior court for relief.
In light of the foregoing, the trial court was correct in
holding that defendallt county had exceeded its power to tax
the airplanes here involved and ill entering judgment in favor
of plaintiff.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
"-""':
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CAR'l'ER, J.-I concnr in the judgment of affirl11allee.
'flte issue presentcd by this case is: To what extcnt can
the domicilc state of an interstate and foreign air carrier illlpose an ad valorem tax on its property when one or more nOlldomiciliary statcs have acquired the power to impose an ad
valorem tax on an apportioned basis. While the decided
eases seem to hold tl1at under the circumstances the domicile
:.tate cannot tax on the basis of the full assessed valuation of
all the property, the precise extent of its power to tax has
not yet been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
The principles bearing on this issue are contained in several
recent cases. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322
U.S. 292 {64 S.Ct. 950, 88 L.Ed. 1283, 153 A.L.R. 245], the
court held that Minnesota, the domicile of the airline, had constitutional power to tax the airline's entire fleet of aircraft at
its full value even though all the planes were continuously
engaged in interstate flights. In this case Chief Justice Stone
wrote a vigorous dissent in which he held that Minnesota
could only impose an apportioned tax. In 1949 theSupreme Court held in Oft y. Mississippi Vallcy Barge Line Co.,
336 U.S. 169 {69 S.Ct. 432, 93 L.Ed. 585), that Louisiana, a
llondomiciliary state, could tax barges and tugs, moving in
and out of the state, on an apportioned basis according to the
commerce carried on within the state. In Standard oa Co. v.
Peck (1952), 342 U.S. 382 {72 S.Ct. 309, 96 L.Ed. 427, 26
.>\.L.R.2d 1371], involving vessels traveling on the Mississippi
River, the Supreme Court adopted the rule that a domiciliary
state could not tax the full value of prop~rty located only
part of the time within its borders, and which must have acquired a tax situs elsewhere, without constituting an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. The court said,
at page 384: "The rule which permits taxation by two or more
states on au apportioned basis precludes taxation of all of
thc property by the state of the domicile." Northwest Airlines was distinguished on the ground that in that case it had
not been shown that "a defined part of the domiciliary
corpus" had acquired a taxable situs elsewhere. The court
did not spell out, however, the extent of the domicile's taxing
power under the cirC'lllustanees. Finally, in ] 954, in Braniff
Air'ways, Tnc. v. Neb,·(1ska Slaie Bom·tl of Rqun7izatirm and
AsscssmclIf, 347 U.S. 590 [74 S.Ct. 757, 98 L.Ed. 967], the
court, applying the reasoning of the Ott case, upheld the
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power of a nondomiciliary state to impose an apportioned tax
on planes and flight equipment used by the taxpayer in operating a purely interstate line.
In the present ease Los Angeles County, the domicile for
tax purposes, seeks to impose an ad valorem property tax
on the full value of five aircraft belonging to Flying Tiger
Line, used chiefly in the Korean Airlift, but also used in other
foreign and interstate commerce. The tax was paid under
protest, and in the suit for refund the trial court gave judgment for plaintiff in an amount equal to the difference between the tax paid on the full value and the tax that should
have been paid on a value apportioned according to the time
the planes were physically present in the county during a
certain test period.
I agree with the views expressed in the opinion prepared
by Mr. Justice McComb which holds, in effect, that where a
nondomiciliary state has acquired the power to impose an apportioned tax, the domicile must also impose an apportioned
tax. There is no express authority to support this proposition, but it appears to be in harmony with. sound principles
of constitutional law.
The commerce clause is violated when a tax subjects interstate commerce to an undue burden or creates a risk of such
a burden. However, it has been recognized that interstate
commerce should "pay its way" in the states where it receives substantial benefits and protection, with the result that
reasonable state taxation is permitted. To avoid a violation of
the due process clause, the tax must bear a reasonable relation
to the benefits and protection conferred by the taxing state.
These rules were recognized in the Standard Oil ease where the
court said: "The rule which permits taxation by two or more
states on an apportionment basis precludes taxation of all
of the property by the state of the domicile. Otherwise there
would be multiple taxation of interstate operations and the
tax would have no relation to the opportunities, benefits, or
. protection which the taxing state gives those operations."
The rule stated in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice
McComb presents no real risk of multiple taxation. A cumulative burden could result from the use in different states of
different apportionment formulae, but this is not very likely.
Apart from this slight possibility, apportionment of the tax
base is generalJy acknowledged to be the best way to avoid
multiple taxation. It was stipulated at the trial that the aircraft in question were physically present in Los Angeles

)
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County only 36.37 per cent of the time during a test period.
This percentage was used to apportion the value of the planes
by the trial court and is reasonably related to the benefits and
protection conferred by the county. Therefore, there does not
appear to be a violation of due process.
I can see no basis for holding that the ease be remanded
to the board of equalization for a hearing to determine whether
any other state has acquired the power to impose an apportioned tax under the rule of the Braniff case. The trial court
was apparently satisfied that such a showing had been made.
If no state has such power, then Los Angeles County may
tax on the full value of the aircraft under the holding of the
Northwest Airlines case. On the other hand, if one or more
states have -such power, then the Standard Oil case applies,
and the full value cannot be taxed.
I have found no authority holding that the board of equalization should determine to what extent the property has
acquired a taxable situs elsewhere, and then should order a
reassessment of the tax aceordingly. Under this basis of taxation an undue burden on interstate commerce is likely to
result in two different ways. The board of equalization is required to determine whether any portion of the Flying Tiger
Line's property has acquired a taxable situs elsewhere and
what that portion is. Although tests framed by the Supreme
Court are available to aid the board in this determination,
there are no iron-elad rules describing what contacts are sufficient to give a st.ate jurisdiction to tax. Thus it may be that
while the board will find that certain property has not acquired a taxable situs in another state and so is taxable in full
by Los Angeles County, the taxing authorities in that state
may reach a contrary determination and impose a tax under
that state's apportionment formula. The cumulative burden
that would result is apparent.
An undue burden may also arise because of the various
formulae for apportionment. used among the states. These
formulae are computed on the basis of the presence of the
aircraft in and out of the state, mileage in and out of the state,
arrivals aud departures in and out of the state, revenue earned
in and out of the state, as well as many combinations of these
factors. With a 100 per cent tax base being applied in the
domicile state, different formulae applied by other states are
very apt to l('nd to excrssive taxation.
That pr]':;onal property has its situs at tIl!' owner's domicile,
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has long been recognized as a fiction employed to prevent
migratory property from avoiding taxation completely. (PuZlfllo.n's Palace Car Co. v. Pcnnsylt'onia, 141 U.S. 18, 29 [11
S.Ot. 876, 35 L.Ed. 613].) This fiction was primarily used in
cases involving ocean-going vessels which acquired no actual
situs elsewhere. It was thought that if they were not taxable at the domicile they might not be taxable at all. (Oft
v. Mississippi Valley Barge Li7le, S1tP"Q, p. 173.) As Chief
Justice Stone said in IJis dissenting opinion in the Northwest
Airlines case: C CAnd our decisions establish that, except in
the case of tangibles which have nowhere acquired a tax situs
based on physical presence, and for that reason remain taxable at the domicile even if never present there, the state's
power to tax chattels depends on their physical presence and
is neither added to nor subtracted from because the taxing
state mayor may not happen to be the state of the owner's
domicile." But where it appears that the carrier will not
avoid taxation on a considerable portion of its property, th('re
should be no reason to employ the fiction in whole or in part.
It is obvious that to permit Los Angeles County to tax the full
value of the property here involved, would impose a tax
beyond that justified by its physical contacts with the county,
a tax that the county has no power to impose, and thus violatt·
due process. Moreover the tax is not reasonably related to
the benefits and protection conferred by the county. "So far
as due process is concemed the only question is whether the
tax in practical application has relation to opportuniti('~,
benefits, or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing
state." (Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line, supra, p. 174.)
It is of soine significance to note that recommendations made
by the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1945, as a result of the
confusion engendered by the Northwest Airlines case indicate
disapproval of the domicile basis for taxation and support for
some system of apportionment of the tax base. (See Multiple
Taxation of Air Commerce, B.R. Doc. No. 141, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess.)
It has be('n suggested that Flying Tiger Line will prolJnhly
avoid taxation of a large portion of its property becaus('
the greater part of Flying Tiger's Flights are overseas. This
sugg('stion is probably well-founded. Another quotation from
the dis.'>entillg opinion of Chief Justiee Stone in the Northwest
Airlines case, however, adequately disposes of this point: ''It
is no answer to suggest that tlle states other than Min))('sota
have not asserted their constitutional power to tax or that wpo
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do not know how or to what extent tlH'Y have exercised it.
,The extent to which Olh~ slat.e mRY (:ollsl if nfionally 1RK the
instrunH'nls or inlerRtllte lransporalion £loPS 1101 dqlPlld on
,what other states may happen to do, hilt. Oll what the taxing
~taln has l'onstitutional power to do."
Thr logie of the foregoing is iucscapalM.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. Migratory property not subject
to taxation elsewhere remains taxaNe at the owner '8 domicile,
for otherwise it would escape taxation altogether. (N ow York
Central &- H. R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 597 [26 S.Ct.
'714,50 L.Ed. 1155J ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Ke'lli1teky, 222 U.S.
63, 69, 73 [32 S.Ot. 13, 56 L.Ed. 96]; Northwest At'rUnes,
:111C. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 294 [64 S.Ct. 950, 88 L.Ed.
1283,153 A.L.R. 245J ; Bmnifj Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska Slate
Board of Eq. &-A., 347 U.S. 590, 602 {74 S.Ot. 757, 98 L.Ed.
967J ; Olson v. City &; County of San Francisco, 148 Cal. 80,
83, 84 [82 P. 850, 113 Am.St.Rep. 191, 7 Ann.Cas. 443, 2
L.R.A. 197J ; California Shipping Co. v. City &- County of San
Francisco, 150 Cal. 145, 146 [88 P. 704).) To the extent that
the property is taxable elsewhere it cannot be taxed by the
domiciliary state, for otherwise it would be subject to multiple
burdens in violation -of the commerce clause. (Stan(lard Oil
Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 385 [72 S.Ct. 309, 96 L.Ed. 427, 26
A.L.R.2d 1371]; Western Live Stock v.Bureau of Revenue,
303 U.S. 250, 255-256 [58 S.Ot. 546, 82 L.Ed. 823, 115 A.L.R.
944J.) Random excursions of migratory property into a state
do not render the property taxable there, but if there is
habitual use of such property in a state, the average amount
thus habitually used is taxable ther<', even t.hougb the specific
items are not continuously the same. (American Reft'igerator
Transit Co. v. Han, 174 U.S. 70, 82 [19 S.Ct. 599, 43 L.Ed.
899) ; Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158, 162 [54
S.Ct. 152, 78 L.Ed. 238J.)
.
Under the foregoing rules, defendants are not precluded
from taxing the aircraft in question except to the extent that
they are taxable elsewhere. The majority opinion, however,
is at odds with these rules in holding that the county must
limit the tax on the aircraft according to the time they are
physically present in the county, even if they are not taxable
elsewhere.
The county board of equalization was likewise at odds with
these rules in deciding that the aircraft were taxahle 011
I
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their full value at the commercial domicile l on the ground
that apportionment of the tax was not required as a matter of
law since the aircraft werc not flown on a schedule. The
board's failure to determine whether or not any part of the
property had acquired a taxable situs elsewhere was error, for
defendants' power to tax is diminished accordingly if t}1C
property has acquired a taxable situs elsewhere (Standard Oil
00. y. Peck, supra, 342 U.S. 382, 384), whether or not otlu'r
jurisdictions elect to assert their taxing power. (Johnson Oil
Bel. 00. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158, 162 [54 S.Ct. 152, 78
L.Ed. 238].) Even migratory property that does not travel
on a schedule may become subject to taxation in other jurisdictions.
It cannot be assumed, however, that the aircraft had
acquired a taxable situs elsewhere merely because they were
absent from Los Angeles County a large part of the time.
No such assumption is supported by Standard Oil 00. v.
Peck, ""'pra, 342 U.S. 382, invoked by the majority opinion.
The court there struck down au unapportioned tax imposed
by the domiciliary state on oil barges that traveled the inland
waters of the :Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. It reasoned that
river craft almost continuously within other states were subject to the taxing jurisdiction of those states, and a tax by
the domiciliary state on their full value would result in
"multiple taxation of interstate operations and the tax would
have no relation to the opportunities, benefits, or protection
which the taxing state gives those operations." Barges that
navigate interstate waterways ordinarily acquire more than
one taxable situs along their course. In contrast, aircraft
navigating the sky ordinarily do not acquire any other taxablc
situs along their course. (See concurring opinion of Jackson,
J.in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, npra, 322 U.S.
1Although the ltate of incorporation iB regarded as the legal domicile
of a eorporation, its domieile for tax purposes iB its principal place of
business or headquarters. Thus, the "eommereial domicile" rather than
tile ltate of incorporation ill given the power to tax intangible propcl1;y
of the corporation on the ground that "it ill there that the owner in
cvel')' practical sense realizes the economie advantages of hill ownership."
(Fir.t Bank Stock CM'p. v. MinAe.ota, 301 U.S. 234, 241 [57 S.Ct. 6i7,
81 L.Ed. 1061, 113 AL.R. 228]; see WheeZing S'eeZ Corp. v. Fore, 298
U.S. 193 [56 S.Ct. 773,80 L.Ed. 1143]; Southem Poe. Co. v. McColgan,
68 Ca1.App.2d 48 [156 P.2d 81]; Pacific 'Wed_ OiZ CM'p. v. Franehise
Tare BOGI"d, 136 Cal.App.2d 794 [289 P.2d 287].) Although plaintiff
is ineorporated in the state of Delaware. its principal plaee of business,
ttle home port of its planes, n.nd its repair terminal are aU located in the
County of Los Angeles. Its aircraft habitually retum to tbeir California
beadquarter8.
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292, 304.) The domicile is thereforp free to tax all such
aircraft so long as there if'; no showing tlmt they lulVe maintained sufficiently regular, recurrent physical and business
contacts with other jurisdictions that \vould accordingly subject them to taxation there. (Braniff Airways, I'TIc. v. Nebraska State Board of Eq. &- A" 347 U.S. 590, 600-602 [74
S.Ct. 757, 98 L.Ed. 967] ; New York Ccntra,l &; H. B. Co. v.
Miller, supra, 202 U.S. 584, 597 [26 S.Ct. 714, 50 L.Ed. 1155].)
Since the board erroneously failed to determine whether any
part of the property had acquired a taxable situs elsewhere,
the case should be remanded to it for a redetermination of the
tax on the basis of the evidence submitted at hearings before
it. 2 (Universal Consolidated Oil Co. v. Byram, 25 Ca1.2d 353,
362 [153 P.2d 746].)
If the evidence then showed that the aircraft were not
subject to taxation elsewhere, the county would be free to
tax them on the basis of their full value. (Southern Pac. Co.
v. Kentucky, supra, 222 U.S. 63 ; New York Ce11tral &- H. B.
Co. v. Miller, supra, 202 U.S. 584; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesota, supra, 322 U.S. 292, 298; Braniff Airways, Inc. v.
Nebraska 8tate Board of Eg. &; A., supra, 347 U.S. at 602.)
If, however, the evidence showed that the property had
acquired a taxable situs elsewhere, the county would have to
forego taxation to the extent that other jurisdictions had
acquired the power to impose an apportioned tax. "The rule
which permits taxation by two or more states on an apportionment basis precludes taxation of all of the property by
the state of domicile. " (Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, supra, 342
U.S. at 384.) The board would then be compelled to apportion
the tax on a basis realistic enough to preclude due process
and commerce clause objections. The formula upheld in the
Branif1' case, supra, exemplifies what can be done in this
regard. It encompassed such realistic factors as arrivals and
." [T)he proper proeedure upon the fallure of an administrative board
to give a bearing under appropriate circumstauces is to remand the ease
to the board for proper proceedings. (Citations.) The policy under·
lying such a rule is that the determination of the issues should first be
made by the administrative agency. It is given jurisdiction for that
purpose, and interference with that jurisdiction should not be permittted
until it bas been pursued to the point of exhaustion. I I (Stem v. City
of LOll .4ngelea, 31 Ca1.2d 542, 546 [190 P.2d 937].) Although the term
of a board of equalization is limited by statute (Rev. I; Tn. Code,
t 1603), "that provision is directory only and does not deflect from the
statutory seheme that the authorized tribunal pass upon matters properly
within its jurisdiction though in the complBti01t of its work it must act
at a time beyond the prescribed period." (Unitlllf'saJ ComoZidated Oil Co.
v. Byram, 25 Ca1.2d 553, 862·363 [153 P.2d U6).)

